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Abstract 
Background 
Pressures to keep immigration rates at relatively high levels are likely to persist in most developed 
countries. At the same time, immigrant cohorts are becoming more and more diverse, leading host 
societies to become increasingly heterogeneous across multiple dimensions. For scholars who study 
demographic or socio-economic behaviours, the need to account for ethnocultural “super-diversity” 
brings new challenges and complications.  
Objective 
The main objective of this paper is to present a framework for the prospective analysis of super-
diversity in several high immigration countries. 
Methods 
We developed microsimulation models that simultaneously project several population-dimensions for 
Canada, the United States and countries of the European Union, with the aim of studying the 
consequences of alternate future population and migration trends. 
Results 
The paper presents the projected progression of three indicators of diversity for Canada, the USA and 
the EU28: percentage of foreign-born population, percentage of the population using a non-official 
language at home and percentage of non-Christians under the reference scenario. Results from 
alternative scenarios show the potential impact of modifying the composition of migrant cohorts. The 
paper also examines the projected changes in the labour force for each region by education level and 
language. Finally, the paper proposes a new longitudinal indicator that counts the number of years 
lived as active and inactive over the life course for foreign- and native-born cohorts. 
Contribution 
The microsimulation models provide much more informative results than more traditional cohort-
component or multi-state models to study the future effects of ethnocultural super-diversity on high 
immigration countries. 
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A framework for the prospective analysis of super-diversity 
coming from high levels of immigration 
Alain Bélanger 
Patrick Sabourin  
Guillaume Marois  
Jennifer Van Hook 
Samuel Vézina  
In what Coleman (2006) terms the “Third Demographic Transition,” immigration has led to rapid 
increases in cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity in many high-income, low-fertility countries. This 
rise in “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007) has challenged researchers and policy makers as they 
attempt to understand, anticipate the needs of, and develop policies and programs for multiple, 
highly diverse, subgroups. For demographers, the cohort-component projection model has long 
served as a crucial policy and planning tool, yet this macro-level approach is too blunt of an 
instrument for modeling. In this paper, we argue that a microsimulation approach is better suited for 
this task, and demonstrate this approach using a microsimulation model we developed for Canada, 
the United States, and the 28-member states of the European Union.  
The rise in super-diversity 
Super-diversity has emerged in the broader context of a new demographic regime characterized by 
low fertility, high immigration and population aging. Most developed countries are facing similar 
demographic changes: population aging, possible labour shortages (Mahroum 2001; Martin & Ruhs 
2011; Ruhs & Anderson 2010) and reduced population growth, if not population decline (United 
Nations Population Division 2012). The Baby-Boom experienced by these countries after World War II 
was followed by a rapid fertility decline, which initiated population aging (Caldwell & Schindlmayr 
2003; Coale & Watkins 1986; Gavrilov & Heuveline 2003). Boomers are now reaching retirement age 
and being replaced by smaller cohorts of young workers, which may compromise a balance between 
labour force demand and supply in specific sectors of the labour market.  
In response to these trends, most developed countries have increased their immigration to historically 
high levels. In fact, more people are living abroad than ever before. The United Nations estimates 
that there were 244 million migrants in 2013, up from 173 million in 2000, and more than two thirds 
(71%) of all international migrants live in developed regions (United Nations Population Division 
2016). Accordingly, immigration rates have significantly increased in Canada, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe (Australian Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship 2012; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012; Coleman 2009; Jennissen et al. 2006; 
Zaiceva & Zimmermann 2008). 
International net migration now accounts for about two thirds of the total population growth of 
developed nations, outpacing natural increase (Population Reference Bureau 2012). Most observers 
believe that the current below-replacement fertility regime in Europe will hold true in the future 
(Frejka & Ross 2001; Lesthaeghe & Willems 1999; McDonald 2002). Furthermore, in a little more 
than a decade, the rate of natural increase will become negative in many developed countries, 
leaving immigration as the only positive driver of population growth (Lutz et al. 2014). Moreover, in 
the context of population aging where a growing number of people are about to withdraw from the 
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labour market, economic pressures to keep immigration rates at fairly high levels are likely to persist 
(Martel et al. 2007; Zimmermann et al. 2007).  
At the same time, immigration to developed countries has become more culturally diverse (Cohen & 
Van Hear 2008; Coleman 2006; Massey et al. 1993), dramatically changing the nature of population 
diversity (Vertovec 2007). Diversity in fact has multiple, overlapping dimensions involving 
sociocultural factors such as race, ethnicity, language, and religion, and a host of social and economic 
factors that are associated with these sociocultural factors. Recent censuses and surveys show 
increasing numbers and proportions of immigrants, of people belonging to visible minority 
(ethnic/racial) groups (Statistics Canada 2013), of speakers of non-official languages (Rampton et al. 
1997; Statistics Canada 2007), and of people whose religion is not Christian (Goujon et al. 2007; 
Parsons 1994; Peach 2005; Statistics Canada 2003). These trends are expected to continue in the 
future (Winter & Teitelbaum 2013), raising questions about the long-term sustainability of Western 
countries’ social security programs, healthcare and retirement plans and inequalities (Anderson & 
Hussey 2000; Auerbach & Lee 2011; Lichter 2013; OECD 2000).  
Implications of super-diversity for population research  
It is becoming increasingly important for demographers to account for the multiple dimensions of 
ethnocultural diversity in population projections. This is essential for research on the future 
consequences of immigration, and would also serve to improve analyses of demographic and social 
trends that are not directly focused on immigration because of the way ethnic and cultural groups 
vary in their demographic and socio-economic behaviors. On the demographic side, cultural-ethnic 
and national origin groups often vary with respect to the timing and occurrence of key demographic 
processes: fertility, marriage, mortality, and migration. For example, newcomers tend to show higher 
fertility (Abbasi-Shavazi & McDonald 2000; Andersson 2004; Bélanger & Gilbert 2003; Ng & Nault 
1997; Trovato 1981) and lower mortality due to the healthy immigrant effect (Bourbeau 2002; Chen 
et al. 1996; Hummer et al. 2004; Rees et al. 2009; Singh & Miller 2004; Trovato 1985, 1993; Young 
1987).  
On the socio-economic side, cultural-ethnic and national origin groups often differ in educational and 
employment outcomes. For example, newcomers in Canada show on average higher levels of 
educational attainment (Bonikowska et al. 2008; Geschwender & Guppy 1995; Picot 2008), as the 
immigration policy aims at selecting highly qualified candidates (Beach et al. 2003), regardless of the 
region of origin. In Europe, by contrast, few immigrants are selected according to their skills (Büchel 
& Frick 2005; Münz 2007; Ruhs 2008), and in the US low-skill immigrants make up a large share of 
legal and illegal immigration (Barrett 1998; Borjas 1987, 1989, 1994; Schultz 1998). Generally, when 
controlling for educational attainment, immigrants show lower labour force participation rates than 
natives (Aydemir & Skuterud 2005; Bloom et al. 1994; Boudarbat & Boulet 2007, 2010; Boyd & Cao 
2009; Ferrer & Riddell 2004; Kahn 2004; Meurs et al. 2006; Model & Lin 2002). However, the skill 
composition of immigrant flows affects the average labour force participation rates; immigrants tend 
to have higher participation rates in countries such as the US, or in Southern Europe, where they are 
generally less skilled (OCDE 2011).  
According to Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot (2000), the cohort-component method “is now nearly the 
only method used for population projections, representing a rare consensus for the social sciences.” 
However, super-diversity is impossible to account for with standard cohort-component projection 
models, including its multi-state variants. Although cohort-component projections are frequently 
produced separately for major demographic groups (such as by major racial or ethnic groups), they 
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are inherently based on aggregated population estimates and rates, and are not agile enough to 
handle multi-dimensional and dynamic forms of diversity.  
First, the cohort-component projection method tends to treat groups as mutually exclusive and 
separated fixed categories (e.g., immigrant status Lanzieri 2011; race/ethnic groups Colby & Ortman 
2014; religion Pew Research Center 2015; or language spoken Termote et al. 2011). Yet group 
identities often involve multiple, overlapping dimensions that do not fit neatly in mutually exclusive 
groups. Moreover, ethnic group identities may shift or fade over time, such that later generation 
group members no longer identify with the group. For example, Duncan and Trejo (2011) show 
substantial ethnic attrition among Hispanics that is strongly linked to inter-ethnic marriage, which 
increases across generations and with higher levels of education. This process, which can be 
conceptualized as intra-generational and inter-generational ethnic mobility, can hardly be modeled 
with the cohort-component projection method. 
Second, cohort-component models also ignore heterogeneity within groups. For example, most 
projections assume that all women have the same age-specific fertility rates, or all people experience 
the same age- and sex-specific mortality rates, when in fact, these processes are likely to depend on 
a number of socio-economic and cultural factors. Additionally, the composition of groups may change 
over time. Indeed, it is widely thought that immigrants and their families undergo profound cultural 
and socio-economic changes as a consequence of coming into contact with host societies. Although 
the pace (and even direction) of integration varies across groups, nearly all national origin groups in 
the United States or Canada speak English or French by the second generation (Bélanger et al. 2011; 
Rumbaut et al. 2006), and among immigrant groups that arrived with low levels of education, 
educational attainment tends to increase substantially across generations (Park & Myers 2010).  
Third, cohort-component models have practical limits in the number of events, states, and groups 
that can be modeled. Typically, they provide information about projected population size, growth, age 
structure, and at the most one other dimension, but rarely provide information on socio-economic 
characteristics. Yet the prospective analysis of the consequences of super-diversity requires the 
simultaneous projection of a large number of individual characteristics or attributes, all of them 
having several categories. This extends beyond the capacity of the multistate model whose state-
space (matrix size) would have to include all possible combinations of attribute values. These 
limitations suggest that it would be useful to develop a projection model that goes beyond the 
cohort-component model.  
We developed a microsimulation model to meet this need. The model is designed to provide 
prospective analyses of the socio-economic and cultural consequences of population changes in high 
immigration countries. International in scope, we originally developed the model for Canada, but have 
since adapted it for other immigration-receiving countries, including the United States and the 28-
member countries of the European Union. The model could also be extended to other countries with 
similar demographic regimes, such as Australia. In developing the model, our main objective has 
been to study the possible consequences of alternate future immigration trends in order to inform 
policies about important issues such as the integration of new immigrants, social cohesion, labour 
force supply and composition in terms of education level and skills, or long-term sustainability of 
social security programs and retirement plans. To achieve this objective, the model encompasses as 
many socio-economic and ethnocultural indicators as are available for each projected population.  
Our purpose for the remainder of the paper is to present the analytical framework behind this 
endeavour, describe the general structure of the microsimulation models and share some of the 
results. We first describe the analytical framework of the research project and the general structure 
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and logic of the microsimulation models in the next section. More detailed technical description of the 
modules which make up the model in terms of their events, their parameters and their outputs can 
be found elsewhere (Bélanger & Sabourin 2017; Lutz & Bélanger 2017; Marois et al. 2017). Next, we 
provide an overview of the similarities and differences of the concepts used in the different countries. 
Ideally, all markers of ethnocultural diversity would be available for all countries of interest and have 
the same categories everywhere, but in reality, this is not the case. Finally, we present some results 
to illustrate how the microsimulation models can be used. We present results that assess the impact 
of immigration on the ethnocultural (immigrant status, language and religion) and socio-economic 
(educational attainment, employment status) characteristics of each population. The results section 
also examines the projected changes in the labour force in each country by education level and 
language spoken, key characteristics for the analysis of economic integration. 
An analytical framework for the prospective analysis of super-diversity  
Unlike the cohort-component projection method, which uses aggregated population estimates as 
inputs and outputs, our microsimulation model operates at the individual level. It projects the 
occurrence and timing of demographic and socio-economic events that shape future characteristics of 
individuals and their future offspring based on a series of interrelated multivariate prediction models. 
In this section, we describe the three analytic stages or steps we employed when developing the 
models for each country or world region, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: An analytical framework for the prospective analysis of super-diversity 
 
The first stage is devoted to the analysis of the effects of ethnocultural characteristics on the 
demographic and socio-economic behaviours of population groups. This analysis is necessary to 
estimate the parameters that will serve as inputs in the microsimulation model. It also provides the 
basis for a deeper comparative knowledge of demographic and socio-economic behaviors of new 
immigrants in different Western countries. During this first phase, analytical efforts concentrate on 
deriving the net effects of ethnocultural variables – such as race, religion, language use and 
immigration status – on the components of population change and labour market outcomes. Control 
variables of interest include age, sex and education level. The analyses aim at finding the impact of 
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ethnocultural variables on fertility, on the likelihood of being unemployed or on the probability of 
achieving a given education level, to name but a few examples. Multivariate analyses are performed 
on available public microdata sets such as censuses or social surveys. Base risks by age and sex (and 
sometimes by other available variables, such as education) are usually derived from the most robust 
available data sources (often vital statistics). Ethnocultural differentials, which are sometimes derived 
from surveys with lower sample sizes, are added in the form of relative risks derived from regression 
parameters, controlling for variables included in the base risk. This method allows for maximum 
flexibility in the use of the various available data sources. Scenarios can then be built by modifying 
the base risks or by making alternative assumptions on the relative risks. 
Our analysis of differentials in behaviours is rooted in the segmented assimilation thesis (Portes & 
Zhou 1993). As such, it is assumed that the process of acculturation, by which diverse ethnic groups 
come to share the culture and adopt the behaviours of the majority (Waters & Jiménez 2005) does 
not operate uniformly on all immigrants. Divergent outcomes have been observed between cohorts of 
immigrants (Picot & Heisz 2000) and between racial or visible minority groups (Ali & Grabb 2017; 
Caron Malenfant & Bélanger 2006; Corak 2008; Lian & Matthews 1998; Safi 2006). Yet, although the 
assimilation perspective has been challenged, our framework nevertheless underlines the importance 
of taking into account the duration of residence in the country when studying and projecting 
behaviours of newcomers. Thus, “duration of stay in the host country” and place of birth are 
introduced as important sources of potential change, for example in fertility behaviour or in the 
knowledge of the host country language. Moreover, according to Vertovec (2007), ethnicity or 
country of origin alone provide a misleading one-dimensional appreciation of “super-diversity”. He 
also proposed the term to emphasize that ‘there is much to be gained by a multi-dimensional 
perspective on diversity both in terms of moving beyond the ethnic group as either the unit of 
analysis or sole object of study and by appreciating the coalescence of factors which condition 
people’s lives’ (Vertovec 2007, p. 1026). In our analysis, we therefore explore the complexity of 
super-diversity by using, in addition to duration of stay in the country of residence and place of birth, 
other dimensions of ethnocultural diversity such as race, religion or language proficiency when 
available.  
In the second stage, knowledge arising from the analysis of ethnocultural differentials is integrated 
into specific scenarios to inform the multiple assumptions supporting the microsimulation model. 
Importantly, these assumptions can be combined to create plausible population changes or policy 
driven “what-if” scenarios. In the context of the new immigration regime of high immigration and low 
fertility that describes the countries under study, we sought to evaluate the likely impacts of various 
future immigration scenarios. In other words, the level and composition of future cohorts of 
immigrants are treated as a policy-driven phenomenon. Characteristics of recent immigrants as 
observed in censuses or other sources can be used as a basis for a “baseline” scenario, but these 
characteristics can also be modified through reweighting procedures to match any other desired 
distributions (i.e., changes in regions of origin or in education level of future immigrants, etc.).   
Although central to the current demographic trends of high immigration and low fertility, immigration 
is not the only component of population change shaping the structure and composition of future 
populations. Most of the changes in the native population are assumed to be shaped in accordance 
with the Demographic Metabolism theory (Ryder 1965) which puts forward the importance of cohort 
succession to explain social changes. According to the theory, even if individuals’ characteristics 
(education, language, etc.) tend to remain fairly stable over the life course, this process provides 
opportunity for social change due to the constant flow of new people entering the social process 
through birth and the continuous exit of older individuals through death (Lutz 2013).  
  
6
For example, women with higher education levels not only tend to postpone childbearing, but also 
show, in most countries, lower completed fertility compared to less educated women (Basten et al. 
2014). At the same time, increasing education also tends to postpone entry into the labour market, 
but increases work intensity (higher participation rate, lower unemployment) of both males and 
females over their lives, as it more than compensates for the late entry into the labour market due to 
longer time spent studying (Mincer 1974). As younger cohorts entering the labour market or the 
childbearing ages are more educated than the older cohorts exiting it, the consequence is that, even 
if nothing else changes, we can expect that the total number of births would decline and that the 
total labour force population would increase over time. Thus, the future increase in average education 
level of the population, that is already built into the current age/education structure, will affect not 
only the composition of future population in terms of education level, but also their future aggregated 
demographic (fertility, mortality) or economic (work intensity) behaviours. We want to measure these 
potential effects of demographic metabolism both from a cross-sectional perspective (total fertility 
rate, gross labour force participation rate, etc.) and longitudinal perspective (completed cohort 
fertility, cohort economic dependency ratio, etc.). 
In the third stage, we use dynamic microsimulation to synthesize the outcomes of the two other 
phases in projection models. Microsimulation is a necessary technique to produce demographic and 
socio-economic projections in the context of super-diversity as it enables the modeling of complex 
behaviours and a large number of variables in a consistent and flexible way. The capacity of the 
microsimulation model to project a large number of characteristics simultaneously also allows for the 
production of detailed tables of the projection results. Results can be displayed in the form of cross-
sectional distributions of the population at different points in time up to the projection horizon, but 
with many more details than would be possible with deterministic approaches to population 
projections.  
Microsimulation models for Canada, United States, and European Union 
Three microsimulation models were developed, one for Canada, one for the United States and one for 
the 28-member states of the European Union. All three share a common structure and general 
characteristics with respect to the analytical framework presented above. One necessary input to the 
microsimulation process is the base population, which must have micro-level information on the large 
number of individual characteristics related to “super diversified” populations. At the minimum, 
detailed data are needed on birthplace, and some other measure of diversity, either ethnicity (race), 
language, or religion. In addition, in order to add a socio-economic dimension to the models, data on 
education level and labour market activity are required. 
The base population of all models comes from a public use microdata file of a recent survey or 
census. This allows for greater portability and also increases the transparency of the model and its 
potential usage since its code and parameters, including the base population, can be shared without 
risk of breaching confidentiality rules, which are two important qualities to microsimulation models 
(Sutherland, 2017). The base population of the Canadian model was extracted from the Public Use 
Microdata file of the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS). The survey numbers a little more than 
880,000 cases and directly measures all the variables included in the microsimulation model (See 
table A1 in annex). The base population of the American model was extracted from the 2015 
American Community Survey (ACS). All variables were directly extracted from the ACS public use data 
file with the exception of religion, which was imputed from the 2014 PEW survey. In total, the base 
population numbers more than 3.1 million cases representative of the total American population. The 
base population of the European model was generated from the public use EU-Labour Force Survey 
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microdata files. Language spoken at home and religion were imputed based on data extracted from 
the European Social Survey (all available waves since 2002). The two most recent waves of the EU-
LFS Survey (2014 and 2015) were merged to increase the sample size, with the total base population 
numbering near 8.3 million cases.  
All three models are time-based and event-based, dynamic, continuous time, open to international 
migration, stochastic (Monte Carlo) microsimulation projections and use the Modgen1 programming 
language. The models are time-based, meaning that all individuals are simulated for one stage in 
time (one year) before moving to the next stage in time. This allows for interactions between 
individuals and also for the use of contextual variables or feedback effects in the computation of the 
probability of the occurrence of a given event. The models are dynamic and in continuous time, 
meaning that characteristics of individuals are modified continuously in “real time”, in contrast to 
discrete-time models where characteristics are changed within predefined time units (typically one 
year). This allows for an easier treatment of competing risks. All three models simultaneously projects 
demographic (age, sex, place of residence, immigrant status), ethnocultural (country of birth, 
language, and where possible other variables such as visible minority groups in Canada or race in the 
United States and religion in both Canada and Europe) and socio-economic (education, labour force 
participation, unemployment) characteristics. Table A.1 (see annex) details the categories of the 
different variables that are projected for each model. Accounting for immigration, all three models 
work with age at immigration and duration of residence in the country for immigrants. The models 
further allow for changes in individual characteristics over the life course as well as for inter-
generational transfers of some characteristics of the mother to the child. Finally, the models are 
microsimulation projections. Individuals from the base populations are simulated one by one, rather 
than projected as aggregated population groups as in the cohort-component or multi-state models. 
The occurrence of any events that shape the future population depends on a selection of individual 
characteristics that can vary from one type of event to another and between countries.  
For each event occurring in the projection model Table 1 shows the individual characteristics taken 
into account to determine the probability of its occurrence and derive its waiting time. Each event can 
have its own set of determinants. Taking the example of fertility, in all three models, the risk of giving 
birth varies with age, region of residence, education and immigrant status. However, microsimulation 
is a flexible methodology allowing the use of different equations and risk models for the same event 
according to an individual’s region or country of residence. Thus, when available, other ethnocultural 
determinants of fertility are accounted for, such as religion and visible minority group in Canada or 
race in the United States.  
  
                                               
 
1 Modgen is a meta language of C++ developed and maintained by Statistics Canada. Modgen and its 
documentation may be downloaded for free on Statistics Canada’s website. Modgen models are coded and 
implemented in the Microsoft Visual Studio software suite. Once compiled, a Modgen model takes the form of 
a stand‐alone executable file (.exe) that allows manipulation of the model through a graphical user interface. 
From this interface the user is able modify simulation parameters and create customized scenarios. 
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Table 1: The determinants of the different events in the microsimulation models 
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Fertility X  X X C,U X X  C X   Vital statistics, logistic 
regression 
Mortality X X X C      C   Population estimates, 
Cox regression 
Internal migration X X X C,U C,U  C,U C,U C,U C,U  C,U Logistic regression; 
O/D matrices 
Emigration X X X C         Population estimates, 
relative risks 
Official language 
acquisition/Language used at 
home 
X  X   X X X     
Survival curves, O/D 
matrices 
Intergenerational language shift   X   X  X     O/D matrices 
Intergenerational transfers of 
race/visible minority     C,U C,U       O/D matrices 
Intergenerational transfers of 
religion X X C,U   C,U   C,U    O/D matrices 
Education attainment X X X X C,U X  X E  E,U  Multinomial logit
Literacy C C C C  C  C  C  C Linear regression
Labour force participation and 
unemployment X X X  X X X   X   Logistic regression 
Note: X= All models, C= Canada, E= EU28, U= USA 
Results 
The microsimulation models provide a lot of flexibility in terms of scenario building. Assumptions can 
be made on the future evolution of the different components of population change both in terms of 
the general intensity of the phenomenon or its composition. Assumptions about future immigration, 
for instance, can be made not only on the size of the future cohorts of immigrants, but also in terms 
of its composition by country of origin, education level or any other characteristics that can be 
relevant.  
In this section, we provide five examples that demonstrate ways that the microsimulation models can 
be used. The first example is a simulation that projects ethnocultural and socio-economic changes for 
the baseline scenario only. That is, the scenario assumes the continuation of current trends and 
generally replicates the medium scenario of national statistical agencies in terms of projected 
population size and age structure. The second example is a simulation of the consequences of 
changing levels of immigration. It specifically focuses on labour force consequences of different levels 
of immigration by constructing stylised scenarios where the number of immigrants is doubled or set 
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to zero. The third example is a simulation that assesses the impact of changing characteristics of 
immigrants. It simulates the impact of modifying the composition of migrant cohorts by assuming 
that immigrants to the EU28 or to the USA have the same distribution by education level as Canadian 
immigrants. In the fourth example, we illustrate the possibility of presenting results at a more 
detailed geographic scale. Finally, the fifth example illustrates the way the model can be used to 
provide estimates calculated over the lifetime of cohorts, thus taking a longitudinal perspective for 
estimates of labour force characteristics. 
Example 1: Ethnocultural diversity 
Figure 2 shows the projected evolution of three indicators of diversity for Canada, the USA and the 
EU28: the percentage of foreign-born population (in the EU28 case, it is the proportion of the 
population born outside the EU), the percentage of the population using a non-official language at 
home and the percentage of non-Christians2. In terms of the percentage of foreign-born population, 
Canada is starting at a much higher level (22%) compared to the USA (14%) and the EU28 (5%). 
Compared to the USA, Canada has an immigration rate twice as high and even higher compared to 
the EU28. Assuming that this situation would continue, Canada’s foreign-born population would 
continue to grow at a faster pace than in the other two regions. At the end of the projection horizon, 
the Canadian population can be composed of as much as 29% foreign-born, almost double the 
projected proportion for the USA and more than three times that of the EU28 share.  
Figure 2: Proportion of the projected population with different ethnocultural 
characteristics, 2011-2056, Canada, USA, EU28 
 
                                               
 
2 The percentages of non‐Christian are excluding the non‐affiliated.  
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Looking at the second indicator, the proportion of the population using a non-official language at 
home, the picture is much different. Canadian immigration is much more diverse in its origins and 
languages spoken than what is observed in and projected for the other two regions. Also, there is a 
larger share of its immigrant population that already speaks the official languages (English and 
French) at arrival compared to the United States, where a large share of immigrants speaks Spanish. 
Perhaps because of this greater heterogeneity, the retention of foreign languages might be lower in 
Canada than elsewhere. As a consequence, even if Canada has the highest share of foreign-born and 
the fastest increase in that share, the USA shows a much higher proportion of its population using a 
non-official (mostly Spanish) language at home.  
Religion is another relevant ethnocultural characteristics for the projection of diversity as religious 
diversity is often seen as a source of social fragmentation and declining social cohesion (Alesina et al. 
2003; Goujon et al. 2007). Again, the progression of this indicator draws a different picture. At the 
start of the projection, the proportion of non-Christians is higher in Canada and it is expected to grow 
faster during the projection period. In Canada and in EU28, the proportion of non-Christian 
population is projected to increase faster than the proportions of immigrants or the proportion of the 
population using a non-official language at home. This is because children of immigrants born in the 
country of destination are by definition native-born and because the inter-generational transfer of 
religion is lower than the inter-generational transfer of language. Although children born in an 
immigrant family where a non-official language is spoken will also use that language at home, they 
are more likely to experience a language shift when forming their own family than to undergo a 
change in faith.  
Example 2: The number of immigrants 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of different levels of immigration on the linguistic composition of future 
labour force by assuming stylised scenarios where the number of immigrants is either doubled or set 
to zero. Although they start at different levels, the patterns showed by the evolution of this variable is 
similar in Canada and in the United States. In the baseline scenario and the doubling migration 
scenario, the percentage of the population using a non-official language at home increases rapidly at 
first, but the rate of increase decreases with time. In the EU, the percentage of non-official language 
starts at a lower level at the beginning of the projection period, but increases faster than in Canada 
and the United States. In the no-migration scenario, the percentage of the population using a non-
official language at home would go down in Canada and the United States, but would remain at 
about the same level in the EU. This is due to the fact that in the European model migrations 
between EU-28 countries are treated as internal migration and are thus continuing at the same pace 
as before in the zero-migration scenario.  
Example 3: The educational attainments of immigrants 
Canada's immigration policy is often praised for its point-based selection system, which focuses on 
variables linked with human capital such as age, education and knowledge of the official languages. 
Because of this point-based system, Canada has a higher proportion of graduated immigrants when 
compared to many other immigration countries. It is interesting to explore how modifying the 
immigrant selection process rather than modifying the size of future immigration cohorts could alter 
the future composition of working populations in terms of education attainment. The indicator is 
obtained by creating a scenario that attributes the Canadian immigrants’ distribution by education 
level to projected immigrants in both regions.  
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Figure 3: Percent of the population speaking a non-official language at home under three 
different assumption of immigration, Canada, USA and EU28, 2011-2061 
 
Figure 4 illustrates such an investigation by looking at what could be the potential impact of 
modifying the composition of migrant cohorts on the size of the active population with post-
secondary education in the EU28 and United States. To put an emphasis on the evolution of the 
working population with post-secondary education rather than on the different population size or 
educational levels observed in the two regions, results are scaled to 100 in 2015. 
The solid lines in the figure represent the projected increase of highly educated in the active 
population under the baseline scenario and we can see that this number is likely to increase faster in 
the EU28 than in the United States. The dotted lines represent the possible evolution of that indicator 
if future immigrants would be selected using a Canadian-like point system (CanSce). For both 
regions, this scenario shows a faster increase in the number of highly educated, but the differences 
between the selection and the reference scenarios are more important in the American model than in 
the European model. At the end of the projection, we observe a difference of 5 percentage points 
between the two American scenarios and a difference of only 2.5 points in the European case. There 
are two reasons for that: the American immigration rate is higher and the average education of 
American immigrants is lower.  
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Figure 4: Growth of the active population with post-secondary education (2015=100), 
USA and EU28, 2015-2060, reference scenario (Ref.) and a scenario where immigrants 
are selected using a Canadian-like point system (CanSce) 
 
Example 4. Regional variations 
The models have an important regional component that does not appear in the results presented so 
far. In the Canadian and American cases, regions are formed from geographic information on the 
metropolitan area and the state (in the American case) or province (in the Canadian case). It is thus 
possible to analyse the future impact of immigration on high immigration regions such as New York, 
Los Angeles or Miami in the United States or Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver in Canada. The 
analysis can focus on the ethnocultural changes in the population composition or on the impact of 
immigration on different labour markets in terms of active and inactive population. In the European 
case, the regions represent each of the national populations forming the EU28 and regional analyses 
would thus be limited to countries.  
To illustrate the possibilities of presenting results at another geographic scale, Figure 5 shows the 
projected change in the population distribution by religious affiliation in six of the G7 countries (Japan 
is missing). 
In all six countries, the share of Christians decreases, but for different reasons. In the United States, 
most immigrants are Christians and the 9 points decrease in the percentage of Christians over the 
projection period results almost all from an increase in Non Affiliated; the Muslims and “Other” 
religions categories having their share increased by only one percentage point over the projection 
period. In the European countries, by contrast, the decrease in the proportion of Christians is much 
less attributable to disaffiliation and much more to the faster increase in the number of Muslims. 
Between 2011 and 2060, the reference scenario projects an increase of the Muslims’ share, varying 
between 6 percentage points for Italy and 12 percentage points for France. Since the reference 
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scenario assumes that the characteristics of future immigrants will be the same as the most recent 
immigrants, the share of the “Other” religions category barely changes over the projection period in 
all European countries. Reflecting the more diverse origins of Canadian immigrants, the figure also 
shows that in the Canadian case, the decrease in the share of Christians is associated with both a 
faster increase in the population of Muslim (plus 6 percent points) and of other religions (plus 3 
percent points).  
Figure 5: Observed (2011/2015) and projected (2060/2061) total population by religious 
affiliation, Canada, USA, EU28, reference scenario 
 
Example 5. A cohort perspective to economic dependency ratio 
The examples provided just now are essentially cross-sectional analyses in that they provide 
estimates of the size or composition of the population or population subgroups at various points in 
time. However, our microsimulation models also permit a longitudinal analysis that follows individuals 
over time. As an example, to better determine the impact of immigration on pension plan 
sustainability (at least in a pay-as-you-go type of pension plan), it is preferable to take a longitudinal 
perspective and count the number of years lived as active and inactive over the life course for 
foreign-born and native-born cohorts. 
We carried out this analysis and present the results in Figure 6, which compares the cohort economic 
dependency ratios of foreign- and native-born by education level. The cohort economic dependency 
ratio (CEDR) is defined as the ratio between the number of years lived inactive divided by the number 
of years lived active over the life course. It takes into account the increase in life expectancy as well 
as, in our microsimulation model, the increase in older worker labour force participation and the 
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increase in educational attainment. CEDR also considers differentials in labour force participation by 
immigrant status and education level and differentials in educational attainment between population 
groups. In the context of current labour market changes, it is important to take these characteristics 
of the population and their plausible evolution in the different regions into consideration to better 
estimate the potential effects of immigration. Education is generally completed by age 25 and, for 
that reason, we compute the CEDR for the population aged 25 and over. 
We note on Figure 6 that for all educational groups combined, the CEDR is higher for immigrants 
compared to natives in all three regions, meaning that in general immigrants contribute fewer years 
of activity for each year lived inactive. The differences between natives and immigrants are larger in 
the EU-28 and smaller in the United States. In the EU28, an immigrant can expect to live 1.4 years 
inactive for each year lived active compared to 0.95 for a European-born. In the United States the 
corresponding ratios are much closer with 0.91 and 0.83. Canada, on the other hand, has the lowest 
CEDR for its native population (0.77) but an intermediate CEDR for its immigrant population (0.96).  
Looking next at the differences in CEDR by educational level, we note that the ratios tend to be lower 
for higher educational levels. This holds for natives and immigrants alike. Higher participation rates 
over the working life and higher age at retirement add up to fewer years lived as inactive for each 
year lived as active among the more educated population. Additionally, immigrants have higher ratios 
than natives for all educational levels except for the less than high school level in the USA, although 
the differences between immigrants and natives tend to decrease as education level increases. 
Limitations 
We aimed at developing microsimulation models to project ethnocultural diversity in selected 
developed countries to foresee the implications of high immigration for demographic changes and of 
socio-economic impacts. Although demographic and socio-economic variables are derived from very 
similar concepts across all studied countries, the nature of ethnocultural variables differ between the 
three models due to different historical and social contexts.  
First, the notion of race or ethnic origin is absent from the European data used (and from most 
European surveys). In the United States, the race variable is built around racial groups (Black/White) 
and from Hispanic and Asian origins from which we created 6 categories, while in Canada the similar 
concept is defined into 12 categories of visible minority groups specified by the 1991 Law on 
employment and equity.  
Second, language variables are part of the Canadian Censuses since its beginning and are still 
omnipresent in Canadian surveys because of the dual French and English origins in Canada. Thus, the 
Canadian model projects the first language spoken by a person (mother tongue), language used at 
home and knowledge of the official languages (English or French), but there is no question on 
language proficiency. The American survey asks only about the language spoken at home, but for 
those not using English it asks the level of proficiency in English, which for our purpose is probably a 
better concept than the Canadian one. Europe is of course a multi-lingual region where the official 
language (or languages in some cases) differs from one country to the other. From the question on 
language spoken at home in the European Social Survey we derived a three-category variable that 
distinguishes speakers of the country’s official language from those speaking another European 
language and those speaking another non-European language.  
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Figure 6: Cohort economic dependency ratios (CEDR) of immigrants and natives by 
education level, Canada, USA and EU28 
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Third, religion is directly asked in the Canadian decennial censuses and the large sample size allowed 
for the creation of eight religious categories reflecting the most important groups of this highly 
multicultural country. The same categories were derived from the PEW survey and imputed to the 
American base population extracted from the ACS. In Europe, the smaller sample size of the 
European Social Survey used to impute religion to the base population and the high prevalence of 
Islam among non-Christian population forced us to create only four categories for the religion 
variable.  
Finally, all three models have a sufficient number of regions of birth categories for foreign-born, but 
these categories differ between models to better reflect the immigration source countries of each. 
Age at immigration and duration of stay in the current country of residence for foreign-born is 
available in all three microsimulation models, but place of birth of parents is only available in Canada 
which allows for a more detailed generational status variable. Despite these limitations and 
inconsistencies across models, our models undoubtedly offer a new innovative tool to address issues 
related to super-diversity in high immigration developed countries. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to present the analytical framework supporting our efforts in 
analysing prospective super-diversity in high immigration countries. We believe that this is important 
because these societies are getting more diverse at a rapid pace. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
diversities have become, and will likely continue to be, a critical matter with political and social 
implications in several countries. Alesina et al. (2003) showed that ethnic and linguistic fragmentation 
can contribute to slower economic growth and more homogeneous countries also tend to be better 
governed. More recently, Patsiurko et a;. (2012) applied a similar analysis to 30 OECD countries for 
two periods (1985 and 2000). They showed that the negative relationship between ethnic 
fragmentation and economic growth is also present in the context of developed economies. 
Increasing diversity from mass migration can also have a negative impact on aspects of social capital 
like shared norms and trust (Levy 2017; Putnam 2007) and have influenced critical political outcomes 
such as the Brexit (Coleman 2016; Gietel‐Basten 2016), the rise of populism movements such as the 
one leading to the election of Donald Trump in the USA, or the recent entrance of deputies from an 
extreme right party (Alternative für Deutschland) in the German’s Bundestag for the first time since 
World War II. Projecting the changes in population composition in terms of diversity has therefore an 
interest per se.  
Another important aspect of our model and analysis is the focus on the projection of educational 
attainment and labour force activity. Although international immigration has, at best, only a small 
effect on a country population aging, the concentration of immigrant cohorts in the working age 
groups can certainly help in addressing slower and possibly negative labour force population growth, 
at least for high immigration regions. By increasing the number of workers, increasing immigration 
can decrease the economic dependency ratio of a population, but in a context of below replacement 
fertility, adopting such a solution leads to a continuously increasing need for immigration (United 
Nations 2000). At best, this is a short-term view. In addition, simply increasing the working age 
population through immigration might not help the economy if the number of unemployed increases 
faster than the number of employed because of low employment rates among migrants (Bélanger & 
Bastien 2013). 
A second objective of this paper was to present the general structure of the microsimulation models 
and to show how much more informative results from this type of projection models can be in 
comparison to more traditional cohort-component or multi-state models. We illustrated this point by 
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presenting a selection of results that demonstrate the capacity of the model to address a variety of 
research questions. In doing so, the paper only superficially touches upon the issues related to 
population changes coming with super-diversity. The models provide many opportunities to conduct 
future in-depth studies, many of which are currently in preparation.  
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Annex 
Table A1: Description of the main data sources and variables included in the three 
microsimulation models 
 
Number of 
categories
Details Number of 
categories
Details Number of 
categories
Details
Demographic variables
Age 0-100
85+ as the open age group; age is also a 
continuous variable
0-100
Age is provided in 5 years age groups in 
EU-LFS, assume an uniform distribution of 
the population in each single year of age 
inside of a given age group
0-100
85+ as the open age group; age is also a 
continuous variable
Sex 2 Female and Male 2 Female and Male 2 Female and Male
Place of 
residence
24
Provinces and CMA counting more than 
500 000 people and 15% visible minorities; 
non-CMA regions and smaller CMAs are 
regrouped at the provincial level into ''Rest 
of province''
28 28 European Union member states 31
Major immigration CMA's, rest of major 
immigration states and rest of census 
regions
Ethnocultural variables
Visible minority 
groups / Race
12
White, Aboriginal, South Asian.Chinese, 
Black, Filipino, Latin Amerian,Arab, 
Southeast Asian, West Asian, Korean, 
Japaneses, Other visible minority
6
Non-Hispanic White, Black, Asian, 
Hipanic, Other, Multi-race
Mother tongue 4
English and French as official languages 
and two groups of non offical language 
(Anglotrope and Francotrope)
Language spoken 
most often at 
home
3
English, French and others
3
Official language of the country of 
residence, Other EU28 languages, Non 
EU28 languages
3
English, Spanish, Other
Knowledge of 
Official Language 
/ 
4
English, French, English and French and 
neither English nor French
English 
Proficiency
3
English only, English proficient, not 
English proficient
Religion 7
No religion, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, 
Jewish, Boudhist, Other religions 4
Christian, Muslim. No religion and Other 
religious affiliation (imputed from the 
European Social Survey)
8
No religion, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, 
Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Other(imputed 
from PEW 2014 survey)
Place of birth 26
Canada, United States,Central America, 
Jamaica, Other Caribbean, South America, 
United Kingdom, Germany, Otehr Northern 
and Western Europe,Poland, otehr Eastern 
Europe, Italy Portugal, Other Soutern 
Europe, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, 
Other Africa, West Central Asia and the 
Middle East, China Hong-Kong, Other 
Eastern Asia, Philippines, Other Southeast 
Asia, India, Pakistan, Oher Southern Asia, 
Oceania and others
12
Own country, EU15, EU13, Europe outside 
EU28, North Africa, Ohter Africa, Near 
Middle east, East Asia, Southeast Asia, 
North America, Australia-Oceania, Latin 
America
11
United-States, Mexico, Central America 
and West Indies, South America, Canada, 
Europe, East-Asia, Southeast Asia, Rest 
of Asia, Africa, Other
Immigration status 3
Non-Immigrant, Immigrant, Non-Permanent 
Resident
3
Non-immigrant, born in EU28, born outside 
EU
2
U.S.-Born, Immigrant
Duration of 
residence
7
Natives, 0-4 years, 5-9 years, … ,20-24 
years, 25+
Age at 
immigration
0-100 0-100 0-100
Generation Status 5 G1, G1.5, G2, G2.5, G3+ 3 G1, G1.5, G2+ 3 G1, G1.5, G2+
Socio-economic variables
Education 4
Less than High school, High school diploma, 
post secondary- less than bachelor, 
University diploma (bachelor or above)
3
Less than High School, High School, Post 
secondary
5
Less than High school, High school 
diploma,Associates Degree, College, 
Professional degree
Education of the 
mother
3
Less than High School, High School, Post 
secondary
3
Less than High School, High School, Post 
secondary
Country of highest 
degree
2 Canada, outside Canada
Labor Force 
Participation
2 Active, Not in the Labor Force 2 Active, Not in the Labor Force 2 Active, Not in the Labor Force
Unemployment 2 Employed, Unemployed
Main data source
National Household Survey Public Use 
Microsample
Merged 2014-2015 EU-Labor Force 
Survey and European Social Survey (2001-
2014), European 2011 Censuses
2015 American Community Survey
Number of cases 882,287 8,297,031 3,147,005
Weights
Average of 60.2, range from 0.1 to 12026.0 Average of 37.0, range from 32.4 to 460.6; 
adjusted to match 2011 Census population 
counts by age, sex, education and place of 
birth
Canada European Union United‐States
